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AN INTRODUCTION TO VISUAL 
MASKING
Visual masking illusions come in different flavors, but in all 
of them a visual stimulus, or some specific aspect of that 
stimulus (for instance the semantic content of a visually 
displayed word) is rendered invisible (or less visible) by 
modifying the context in which the stimulus is presented. 
Thus visibility is reduced without modifying the physical 
properties of the stimulus itself. Visual masking illusions 
allow  us  to  examine  the  brain’s  response  to  the  same 
physical  target  under  varying  levels  of  visibility.  These 
remarkable illusions may allow us to discover many, if not 
all, of the minimal set of neural conditions that cause vis-
ibility, by simply measuring the perceptual and physiologi-
cal effects of the target when it is visible versus invisible 
during visual masking. See Figure 1 for a description of a 
type of visual masking called metacontrast masking, or 
backward masking, in which the target that is rendered 
invisible is presented before the mask. 
Visual masking was discovered almost 140 years ago 
(Exner, 1868). We and others have shown that the neu-
ral correlate of backward masking is the suppression 
of the target’s after-discharge (Macknik & Livingstone, 
1998;  Macknik  &  Martinez-Conde,  2004b).  Forward 
masking, in which the target is rendered invisible by a 
preceding mask, is correlated to the suppression of the 
target’s  onset-response  (Judge,  Wurtz,  &  Richmond, 
1980;  Macknik  &  Livingstone,  1998;  Schiller,  1968). 
The suppressive action of masking takes place at the 
spatiotemporal  edges  of  the  target,  and  it  is  driven 
by  the  spatiotemporal  edges  of  the  mask  (Macknik, 
2006;  Macknik,  Martinez-Conde,  &  Haglund,  2000). 
Together, these results suggest that stimulus visibility 
is caused by the transient bursts of neural activity that 
occur  at  the  spatiotemporal  edges  of  stimuli:  when 
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these  bursts  are  inhibited  by  the  action  of  a  mask, 
visibility is reduced. We have proposed that all of the 
seemingly  complex  timing  actions  of  visual  masking 
are explained by one of the simplest neural circuits in 
the brain: lateral inhibition (Macknik, 2006; Macknik & 
Livingstone, 1998; Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 2004b; 
Macknik et al., 2000). Other studies have also proposed 
that lateral inhibition may explain visual masking ef-
fects (Bridgeman, 1971; Francis, 1997; Herzog, Ernst, 
Etzold,  &  Eurich,  2003;  Weisstein,  1968;  Weisstein, 
Ozog, & Szoc, 1975). However these other models have 
not explicitly captured or explained the role of the after-
discharge in visibility and backward masking. 
Bridgeman  recorded  from  neurons  in  monkey   
striate cortex and concluded that early components of 
the target response were unaffected during backward 
masking, whereas late components were suppressed 
(Bridgeman, 1980). However, late components were 
defined as the average firing for a 210-310 ms period 
that started 70 ms after the onset of the mask (ir-
respective of target onset), and so it was not pos-
sible  to  determine  whether  the  effects  seen  were 
relevant  to  target  responses,  mask  responses,  or 
both. Furthermore, this study did not employ auto-
matic eye position monitoring (an assistant viewed 
the monkey’s face on a TV screen to determine if eye 
movements occurred), and thus it was not possible 
to  know  the  relationship  (or  lack  thereof)  between 
the receptive field and the position of the target or 
mask. Also, Bridgeman did not vary the duration of 
the target or mask, and so could not have differenti-
ated  between  onset-response  and  after-discharges. 
Finally, Bridgeman concluded that late components in 
the neural responses were caused by a combination of 
cortical reverberations [predicted by his lateral inhibi-
tory model (Bridgeman, 1971)], and “cognitive influ-
ences”, which are presumably a function of feedback 
processes. However, neither Bridgeman’s, nor other 
physiological studies of visual masking, have identi-
fied such reverberatory activity. Our lateral inhibition 
model thus varies significantly from Bridgeman’s in 
that  we  have  proposed  that  both  onset-responses 
and after-discharges are due to the target’s temporal 
edges and that visual masking is a function of feed-
forward (non-reverberatory) lateral inhibitory inter-
actions between target and mask. 
Some  groups  have  argued  that  lateral  inhibition 
may not be the main circuit underlying visual mask-
ing, because it is too low-level to explain high-level 
masking effects such as object-substitution masking, 
feature integration, and the role of attention (Enns, 
2002). However, we and others have proposed that 
lateral  inhibition  circuits  that  lie  in  high-level  visual 
areas should indeed have high-level cognitive effects 
(Bridgeman, 2006; Francis & Herzog, 2004; Herzog et 
al., 2003; Macknik, 2006; Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 
2004b). Nevertheless, the fact that lateral inhibition 
can explain visual masking does not itself rule out that 
other circuits, such as feedback inputs, may also be 
involved (Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 2006; Enns & Di Lollo, 
1997; Haynes, Driver, & Rees, 2005; Lamme, Zipser, & 
Spekreijse, 2002; Thompson & Schall, 1999). Here we 
analyze the potential strengths and weaknesses of the 
various proposed feedback models of visual masking.
ARGUMeNTS FOR FeeDbACK IN 
VISUAL MASKING
Öğmen and Breitmeyer’s  
two-channel theory of visual 
masking
In this volume of Advances in Cognitive Psychology, 
Breitmeyer presents the latest version of the famous 
two-channel model of visual masking, which includes a 
requirement for feedback circuits (Breitmeyer, 2006). 
Breitmeyer  and  Ganz’s  (Breitmeyer  &  Ganz,  1976) 
original version of the two-channel model of masking 
proposed that there were two different visual infor-
mation  channels,  one  exhibiting  fast  and  transient 
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Figure 1. 
Perception of a target and mask with respect to temporal 
arrangement. Reprinted from Macknik (2006).The role of feedback in visual masking and visual processing
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characteristics (so that information traveled quickly 
through  the  channel)  and  one  exhibiting  slow  and 
sustained characteristics. The idea was that, during 
backward masking, the neural representation of the 
mask would travel rapidly through the transient chan-
nel and thus intercept the sustained channel’s neural 
representation of the target in cortical circuits where 
the two channels meet. The fast representation of the 
mask  would  thus  suppress  the  slow  representation 
of the target, decreasing target visibility. The differ-
ence in latency (in the sense of propagation speed) 
between the two channels was modeled as a fixed 
physiological parameter. Thus the two-channel model 
required that the target and mask be presented with a 
specific Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA, see Figure 
2). Macknik and Livingstone (1998), and Macknik and 
Martinez-Conde  (2004a)  probed  this  “transient-on-
sustained inhibition” hypothesis psychophysically by 
testing whether backward masking occurred at a spe-
cific SOA, or not. They found that the timing of mask-
ing was not determined by SOA but it depended on a 
previously untested temporal characteristic, Stimulus 
Termination Asynchrony (STA, see Figure 2). Figure 3 
shows that STA determines the perceptual timing of 
backward masking more accurately than either SOA 
or Inter-Stimulus Interval (ISI). Thus the transient-
on-sustained inhibition hypothesis of backward mask-
ing  is  not  sustainable  on  psychophysical  grounds. 
Macknik  and  Livingstone  (1998)  also  showed  that 
forward masking was better explained by ISI than by 
either SOA or STA. Macknik and Livingstone further 
tested the neurophysiological underpinnings of visual 
masking by recording the neural activity from single 
units  in  monkey  primary  visual  cortex  (V1)  during 
forward  and  backward  visual  masking.  The  results 
confirmed  previous  physiological  findings  (Judge  et 
al., 1980; Schiller, 1968) that the neural correlate of 
forward masking was the suppression of the target’s 
onset-response.  They  also  showed  that  backward 
masking  was  correlated  to  the  suppression  of  the 
target’s after-discharge (Figure 4). This physiological 
finding correlated precisely to the psychophysics. It 
also explained why STA was the best timing param-
eter  to  describe  peak  backward  masking:  because 
backward  masking  occurs  when  the  target’s  after-
discharge is suppressed by the mask, it follows that if 
either the target or the mask varies in duration, the 
relative  temporal  delay  between  the  termination  of 
the target and mask should be critical. 
Breitmeyer  and  Öğmen  (2006)  revised  the  two-
channel model, now called the retino-cortical dynamics 
(RECOD) model. One motivation for revision was pro-
vided by Super, Spekreijse, and Lamme (2001), who 
suggested that the late responses of V1 neurons, such 
as  the  after-discharges  in  Macknik  and  Livingstone 
(1998), were caused by feedback from higher visual 
areas,  rather  than  from  the  stimulus’s  termination. 
Breitmeyer and Öğmen (2006) thus proposed that the 
two channel hypothesis was essentially correct, if one 
considered that the fast and slow channels were not 
the magnocellular and parvocellular retino-geniculoco-
rtical pathways, as previously modeled, but were in-
stead feedforward ascending input (fast channel) and 
feedback from higher visual areas (slow channel). In 
the recast two-channel model, the feedforward input 
from the mask would suppress the (delayed) feedback 
input from the target (i.e. the after-discharges), thus 
causing suppression of the target’s visibility. One prob-
lem  with  this  idea,  however,  is  that  after-discharge 
timing  varies  as  a  function  of  stimulus  termination 
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(A) The sequence of events during the course of a visual masking psychophysics trial. The trial started with a delay of 500 to 
1500 msec. In backward masking conditions, the target was presented, followed by the mask. In forward masking conditions, 
masks came before targets. After termination of the second stimulus (mask or target) there was another 500 msec delay, after 
which the subject indicated which side had the longer target. (B) A schematic view of the various timing parameters used. SOA 
= Stimulus Onset Asynchrony, the interval between the onset of target and of mask; STA = Stimulus Termination Asynchrony, 
the interval between termination of target and of mask; ISI = Inter-Stimulus Interval, between the termination of the target 
and the onset of the mask (backward masking) or between the termination of the mask and the onset of the target (forward 
masking). Reprinted from Macknik & Livingstone (1998).128
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Figure 3. 
Psychophysical measurements of the timing parameters important for visual masking. “T” represents the duration (in millisec-
onds) of the target and “M” represents the duration of the mask. Results represent average for 25 subjects. (A) Results from 
backward masking conditions plotted on a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) scale. Note that the points of peak masking (the 
x-intercepts of the drop-lines) are widely dispersed. (B) Results from panel A replotted here as a function of inter-stimulus in-
terval (ISI). The points of peak masking tend to cluster in two places, correlated with mask duration (open symbols vs. closed 
symbols). (C) Results from panel A replotted here on a stimulus termination asynchrony (STA) scale. The points of maximal 
masking are no longer dispersed, and instead cluster around an STA of about 100 ms +/- 20 ms. (D) Linear regression (with 
95% confidence intervals) of peak backward masking times in terms of SOA when the mask was 50 ms in duration. (E) The 
amount of dispersion of peak backward masking times for data tested on a scale of stimulus termination asynchrony (STA), 
inter-stimulus interval (ISI), and stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). Notice that the peak backward masking times are least 
dispersed on an STA scale. Thus STA is the best predictor of backward masking. (F) Results from forward masking conditions; 
the optimal predictor of peak masking is the ISI between the termination of the mask and the onset of the target. Reprinted 
from Macknik & Livingstone (1998).The role of feedback in visual masking and visual processing
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time  (Figure  5).  This  indicates  that  after-discharges 
are not caused by feedback from the stimulus’s onset. 
If after-discharges were caused by feedback, the areas 
providing the feedback would need to be able to predict 
the moment of termination of the stimulus. To the best 
of our knowledge, no study previous to Macknik and 
Livingstone (1998) varied the duration of both targets 
and masks to assess the role of after-discharges in 
visual masking. Thus it had not been possible to differ-
entiate between the role of feedforward and feedback 
circuits in the formation of after-discharges. 
In summary, the RECOD model, which is dependent 
on the idea that after-discharges are due to feedback 
and relies on SOA as the primary timing parameter, is 
not supported by the available physiological and psy-
chophysical data. 
Lamme’s recurrent feedback 
hypothesis of visual awareness 
and masking
Lamme’s  model  of  visual  awareness  and  masking, 
based on physiological recordings in the awake mon-
key, suggests that onset-responses are due to feedfor-
ward input, and late responses (i.e. after-discharges) 
are due to recurrent feedback (Lamme et al., 2002). 
Lamme’s  model  superficially  agrees  with  our  lateral 
inhibition feedforward model in that backward mask-
ing is correlated to the suppression of late responses. 
But a key difference between the two models is that, 
in Lamme’s model, the suppression of late responses 
is caused by a decrease in feedback from higher visual 
areas, whereas in our model late responses are sup-
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Multi-unit recording from upper layers of area V1 in an anesthetized rhesus monkey. The aggregate receptive field was 
foveal, 0.1° square, and well-oriented. In contrast to the recordings from alert animals, where eye movements occur 
frequently, the mask was largely outside the receptive field. The vertical bars (gray for mask, black for target), indicate 
the onset time of the stimuli. Notice that under conditions that best correlate with human forward masking (ISI = 0 ms, 
here corresponding to SOA = -100 ms) the main effect of the mask is to inhibit the transient onset-response to the target. 
Similarly, in the condition that produces maximum backward masking in humans (STA = 100 ms; here corresponding to 
SOA = 100 ms for the 100 ms stimulus on the left, SOA = 500 for the 500 ms stimulus on the right), the after-discharge 
is specifically inhibited. Each histogram is an average of 50 trials with a bin width of 5ms. Modified from Macknik & Liv-
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pressed  by  direct  feedforward  lateral  inhibition.  In 
Lamme’s model, the effect of masking should be stable 
with respect to SOA. That is, target duration should be 
irrelevant because late responses are proposed to oc-
cur as a function of feedback, which is itself generated 
by the target’s onset-response as it rises through the 
visual hierarchy. In our model, target duration is a crit-
ical parameter, because after-discharges are feedfor-
ward transients caused by target termination. Because 
masking  strength  does  vary  as  a  function  of  target 
duration  (Macknik  &  Livingstone,  1998),  Lamme’s 
feedback model can be ruled out on psychophysical 
grounds.  Rossi,  Desimone  and  Ungerleider  (2001) 
have moreover demonstrated that the results reported 
by  Lamme’s  group  (Lamme,  1995;  Lee,  Mumford, 
Romero, & Lamme, 1998; Zipser, Lamme, & Schiller, 
1996), that monkey V1 neurons segregate figure from 
ground, may have been caused by receptive field posi-
tion changes due to uncontrolled eye movements (i.e. 
the receptive field physically traveled over the border 
from the figure to the background).
In  spite  of  these  arguments,  Lamme’s  group  has 
maintained  that  late  responses  are  due  to  feedback: 
Their  1997  Association  for  Research  in  Vision  and 
Ophthalmology conference abstract described that the 
surgical removal of the entire extrastriate visual cortex 
of a monkey (V3, V3a, V4, V4t, MT, MST, FST, PM, DP, 
and 7a) led to a reduction of area V1 late responses 
(Lamme, Zipser, & Spekereijse, 1997). However, surgical 
ablations are irreversible by definition, and the nature of 
the technique is such that it often leads to inconclusive 
results. The surgical removal of the extrastriate cortex 
in a monkey involves the resection of a large portion 
of the entire cerebral cortex, and thus causes massive 
traumatic damage to the brain as a result, including sub-
stantial damage to the cortical lymphatic and vascular 
systems. Therefore it is unclear exactly what processes 
may or may not be affected by such a drastic ablation. 
A less complicated test of the late response’s origin is 
to  vary  the  duration  of  the  target,  which  establishes 
whether the late response timing varies as a function 
of target duration (and is thus a feedforward after-dis-
charge), or not (Macknik & Livingstone, 1998; Macknik 
& Martinez-Conde, 2004b; Macknik et al., 2000). Lamme 
and colleagues did not conduct such a test, and no other 
physiological studies that we know of have supported 
their claim that late responses are caused by feedback. 
Thus the more parsimonious explanation is that late re-
sponses are feedforward after-discharges that occur at 
the termination of the stimulus. 
Most cortical visual neurons are complex in nature 
(they receive inputs from both on and off channels). 
Thus  every  complex  cell  that  responds  to  a  given 
stimulus should produce an after-discharge when that 
stimulus  is  extinguished.  Therefore  any  model  that 
proposes that after-discharges are due to feedback, 
and not to feedforward inputs, must also explain why 
expected feedforward after-discharges are otherwise 
missing,  only  to  be  replaced  by  feedback.  No  such 
model has been forthcoming. 
Object substitution masking
Object substitution masking (OSM) (Enns & Di Lollo, 
1997)  is  an  effect  in  which  a  target  object  is  sup-
pressed by a mask of similar shape, even though the 
mask does not abut the target spatially (as it is neces-
sary in other types of masking discussed here). Enns 
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Figure 5. 
Recording from a typical single neuron from monkey area 
V1 that was stimulated with a target of various dura-
tions.  The  magnitude  of  the  after-discharge  grows  as 
the target duration increases. Reprinted from Macknik & 
Martinez-Conde (2004a).The role of feedback in visual masking and visual processing
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and Di Lollo proposed that OSM must be caused by 
high-level feedback to early visual cortex:
1) The strength of OSM is modulated greatly by covert 
voluntary attention. This suggests that the masking 
circuits are co-localized with, or affected by, high-
level cognitive circuits.
2) We and others have shown that some types of vis-
ual masking are processed within early visual areas 
(Macknik & Haglund, 1999; Macknik & Livingstone, 
1998; Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 2004a; Macknik 
et  al.,  2000;  Tse,  Martinez-Conde,  Schlegel,  & 
Macknik, 2005). Enns (2002) proposed that these 
early  visual  areas  must  receive  input  from  high-
level areas to process visual masking.
3) The OSM effect is based on specific object shapes. 
Since object shape is processed within higher ex-
trastriate visual areas (Kobatake & Tanaka, 1994; 
Tanaka,  Sugita,  Moriya,  &  Saito,  1993;  Wang, 
Tanaka, & Tanifuji, 1996), the circuits that process 
visual  masking  must  be  co-localized  with  higher 
visual areas and then feedback to early visual areas 
(as in 2, above).
Despite these seemingly high-level interactions, 
we have proposed that OSM may be explained by 
feedforward  lateral  inhibition  circuits  (Macknik, 
2006;  Macknik  &  Martinez-Conde,  2004a,  2004b). 
Lateral inhibition is a ubiquitous brain circuit, thus 
it does not only exist within early visual areas, but 
also within the high-level visual areas that process 
object  shape  (such  as  the  inferotemporal  cortex; 
IT). Lateral inhibition circuits within high-level areas 
may thus cause complex perceptual results. Let us 
first consider how lateral inhibition may work, across 
both retinotopic space and time, to cause low-level 
visual masking. Figure 6a represents the spatial lat-
eral inhibition model originally proposed by Hartline 
and Ratliff (Ratliff, 1961; Ratliff, Knight, Dodge, & 
Hartline, 1974). Here, the excitatory neurons in the 
center of the upper row receive excitatory input from 
a visual stimulus (a bar of light, for instance). This 
excitation is then transmitted laterally in the form 
of inhibition, resulting in edge enhancement of the 
stimulus:  the  neuronal  underpinnings  of  the  Mach 
band illusion (Mach, 1965). One can easily imagine 
how the spatial edges of the mask may potentially 
nullify  the  responses  caused  by  the  edges  of  the 
target, if the mask’s edges are positioned spatially 
so as to inhibit the target’s edge enhancement. One 
might expect that the target may in turn also inhibit 
the mask (which does happen to some extent), but 
if  we  consider  the  temporal  aspects  of  the  model 
it  becomes  clear  why  this  inhibitory  interaction  is 
largely from mask to target. Let us now look at the 
same network through time: Figure 6b shows one 
Figure 6. 
(A)  A  representation  of  the  spatial  lateral  inhibition 
model originally proposed by Hartline and Ratliff (Ratliff, 
1961; Ratliff et al., 1974). The excitatory neurons in the 
center of the upper row receive excitatory input from a 
visual stimulus. This excitation is transmitted laterally in 
the form of inhibition, resulting in edge enhancement of 
the  stimulus:  the  neuronal  underpinnings  of  the  Mach 
Band illusion (Mach, 1965). (B) One excitatory and one 
inhibitory neuron taken from the spatial model in pan-
el A, now followed through an arbitrary period of time. 
Several response phases are predicted, including the on-
set-response, and the transient after-discharge (Adrian 
& Matthews, 1927). (C) A representation of the lateral 
inhibition model interactions within object space. The ex-
citatory neurons in the center of the upper row receive 
excitatory input from a visual stimulus (for instance an 
object or group of objects with similar shapes). This ex-
citation is transmitted laterally in the form of inhibition, 
resulting  in  “edge  enhancement”  across  object  space, 
equivalent to the retinotopic edge enhancement in earlier 
levels of the visual pathway (i.e. panel A). These interac-
tions may lead to object-based visual masking illusions. 
Therefore low-level lateral inhibition may explain object 
substitution masking (OSM).132
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excitatory and one inhibitory neuron from the spatial 
network in Figure 6a, followed through an arbitrary 
period of time. Several temporal phases of response 
occur as a function of the lateral inhibitory network, 
thus explaining the formation of the onset-response, 
sustained period, and the transient after-discharge 
(Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 2004b). The temporal 
effects of lateral inhibition thus explain the seem-
ingly mysterious timing of target and mask in visual 
masking: the mask’s onset response and after-dis-
charge must temporally overlap (and spatially over-
lap, as described above) the target’s onset response 
and/or  after-discharge,  in  order  to  suppress  the 
perception of the target. 
If we now assume that this same simple circuit is 
embedded within a high-level visual area, such as the 
inferotemporal cortex (IT), we will see that its bio-
physical behavior remains fundamentally the same. 
However, its significance to perception may now be 
extended to the interactions between whole objects 
(regardless  of  their  location  in  retinotopic  space), 
rather than being constrained to the interactions be-
tween edges across retinotopic space, Figure 6c. This 
simple hypothesis may explain why OSM is strong-
est when the mask is similar in shape to the target 
(i.e.  because  shape  similarity  will  make  the  target 
and mask lie close to each other in the object-based 
topographical cortical map). It also explains why the 
target and mask need not be near each other retin-
otopically during OSM. 
One important facet of OSM is the role of attention. 
Several groups have hypothesized that OSM must be 
mediated by high-level circuits because it is strongly 
modulated by attentional load (Bridgeman, 2006; Enns 
& Di Lollo, 2000), whereas low-level forms of mask-
ing are modulated much less by attention. However, 
the role of attention in OSM may be a red herring, at 
least to the study of visual masking. Attention may 
be  mediated  by  a  separate  dissociated  mechanism 
all its own: this system may then affect circuits that 
mediate visual masking, just as it affects other visual 
processes (i.e. motion perception, shape perception, 
cognition,  awareness,  etc).  The  fact  that  attention 
plays  a  stronger  role  in  OSM  than  in  simpler  forms 
of masking strengthens the lateral inhibition model of 
OSM: Because high-level visual areas are modulated 
more strongly by attention than are low-level visual 
areas, it makes sense that the lateral inhibition circuits 
responsible for OSM may be more strongly modulated 
by attention than the lateral inhibition circuits respon-
sible for simpler forms of visual masking within lower 
visual areas.
Coupled interactions between V1 
and fusiform gyrus
Haynes, Driver and Rees (2005) proposed that tar-
get  visibility  derives  from  the  coupling  of  area  V1 
BOLD  activity  with  fusiform  gyrus  BOLD  activity. 
This  hypothesis  suggests  a  feedback  pathway  from 
the fusiform gyrus to V1, which would then mediate 
the  functional  coupling.  However,  V1  activation  in 
this study may not be related to target visibility, but 
rather may indicate an experimental confound with 
top-down attention (Macknik, 2006). Subjects were 
required to attend actively to the target: focused cov-
ert attention causes increased BOLD activity in hu-
man V1 (Brefczynski & DeYoe, 1999). Haynes, Driver 
and  Rees  attempted  to  control  for  this  attentional 
confound by including a condition in which the sub-
ject’s attention was directed away from the target. 
However, in the final analysis in which coupling was 
found, the target-unattended condition data was not 
included, and so the attentional confound cannot be 
ruled out. Thus the result may be due to the atten-
tional aspect of the attended condition, and not to 
visual masking per se.
Frontal lobe processing of visual 
masking 
Thompson  and  Schall  recorded  from  single-units  in 
the frontal lobes of the awake monkey and concluded 
that visual masking cannot be processed in the early 
visual system, but is instead processed in the frontal 
eye-fields (FEF) (Thompson & Schall, 1999; Thompson 
& Schall, 2000). They suggested that the neural cor-
relate of visual masking is the “merging” of target and 
mask responses, rather than the inhibition of target 
responses. However, their target was almost 300 times 
dimmer than their mask, and so target and mask re-
sponses  may  have  merged  because  of  the  different 
response latencies one would expect from a dim and 
a bright stimulus (Albrecht & Hamilton, 1982; Gawne, 
Kjaer, Hertz, & Richmond, 1996). Moreover, the SOAs 
used were approximately equivalent to the difference 
in latencies that would be expected from a 300X lumi-
nance difference. Because of this combined SOA and 
latency confound, the authors could not have differ-
entiated whether the target’s response was inhibited 
by the mask, or whether the mask’s larger response 
occluded the small and delayed dim-target response. 
In previous experiments by us and others (Macknik & 
Haglund, 1999; Macknik & Livingstone, 1998; Macknik 
&  Martinez-Conde,  2004a,  2004b;  Macknik  et  al., 
2000; Tse et al., 2005), target and mask were of equal The role of feedback in visual masking and visual processing
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contrast to avoid the latency confound. Furthermore, 
when  Thomson  and  Schall  used  either  very  long  or 
short SOAs (in which the target and mask responses 
could  be  differentiated  in  time),  they  found  that  it 
was the mask’s response that was suppressed rather 
than the target’s; this is opposite to what one would 
expect in visual masking. Finally, the monkey’s task 
was to detect a blue target against a field of white 
distracter masks, and so it is possible that differen-
tial attentional effects would suppress the mask but 
not the target. These types of attentional effects have 
been documented in the FEF and other parts of the 
brain when the primate is trained to direct its attention 
to particular colored stimuli (i.e. the blue target) and 
ignore others (i.e. the white mask) (Bichot & Schall, 
1999; Reynolds, Chelazzi, Luck, & Desimone, 1994; 
Reynolds,  Chelazzi,  &  Desimone,  1999;  Reynolds  & 
Desimone, 1999; Reynolds, Pasternak, & Desimone, 
2000). Thus Thompson and Schall’s data may be fur-
ther confounded by the effects of selective attention, 
rather than being the direct result of visual masking. 
ARGUMeNTS AGAINST FeeDbACK 
IN VISUAL MASKING
Feedback in visual masking
To summarize the previous sections, there are several 
facts to consider about the role of feedback in visual 
masking:
1) The neural correlate of forward masking is the in-
hibition of the target’s onset response (Macknik & 
Livingstone, 1998).
2) The neural correlate of backward masking is the 
inhibition of the target’s after-discharge (Macknik & 
Livingstone, 1998).
3) The after-discharge occurs as a function of stimulus 
termination. Responses that occur as a function of 
stimulus  termination  cannot  be  due  to  feedback 
processes. Therefore, after-discharges are the result 
of feedforward connections (Macknik & Livingstone, 
1998; Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 2004a, 2004b; 
Macknik et al., 2000).
a) It follows that the timing of any response due 
to feedback should be invariant with respect to 
stimulus duration. Since visual masking timing 
varies  as  a  function  of  target  duration,  visual 
masking  is  not  due  to  feedback  (Macknik  & 
Livingstone, 1998; Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 
2004a, 2004b; Macknik et al., 2000; Tse et al., 
2005).
4) The relative duration and timing of target and mask 
determine the timing and neural correlates of for-
ward and backward masking (Macknik & Livingstone, 
1998; Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 2004b; Macknik 
et al., 2000). 
The  above  facts  argue  against  a  model  of  visual 
masking  in  which  feedback  plays  a  critical  role. 
Nevertheless, the research discussed thus far has not 
directly tested the potential role of feedback. This sec-
tion will describe experiments we have carried out to 
measure  the  strength  of  feedback  in  visual  masking 
(Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 2004a, 2004b; Tse et al., 
2005). If feedback does play a role in visual masking, 
we should be able to test several strong predictions con-
cerning the behavior of the neural circuits involved. For 
instance, Enns (2002), Breitmeyer and Öğmen (2006), 
and Lamme, Zipser and Spekreijse (2002) have pro-
posed that low-level circuits exhibit masking only due 
A Without Feedback
Monopt L
Dichopt
Left eye
Monopt R Right eye
B With Feedback
MonoptL
Dichopt
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MonoptR Right eye
Dichopt
Dichopt
Figure 7. 
Overriding issues when considering the viability of feed-
back mechanisms. (A) A general model of early visual 
binocular integration without invoking feedback mecha-
nisms. (B)  If  significant  feedback  existed  between  the 
initial dichoptic levels of processing and earlier monoptic 
levels, the earlier levels should behave in the same way 
as the dichoptic levels (i.e. they would become dichop-
tic by virtue of the feedback). Reprinted from Macknik 
(2006).134
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to feedback from high-level circuits. If this hypothesis is 
correct, then low-level circuits should exhibit the types 
of  masking  produced  by  high-level  circuits.  Figure  7 
outlines the logic of this argument for monocular visual 
circuits  that  receive  feedback  from  binocular  circuits 
capable  of  dichoptic  masking.  If  the  activity  within 
early monoptic circuits correlates with the perception 
of visual masking due solely to feedback from dichoptic 
circuits [as argued by Enns (2002)], it follows that the 
activity in early monoptic circuits must also correlate 
with the perception of dichoptic masking. 
The perception of monoptic and 
dichoptic visual masking
The existence of “dichoptic” visual masking is one of 
the  main  reasons  visual  masking  has  been  consid-
ered a cortical process (Harris & Willis, 2001; Kolers & 
Rosner, 1960; McFadden & Gummerman, 1973; McKee, 
Bravo, Smallman, & Legge, 1995; McKee, Bravo, Taylor, 
&  Legge,  1994;  Olson  &  Boynton,  1984;  Weisstein, 
1971).  However,  just  because  dichoptic  masking 
must  arise  from  binocular  cortical  circuits,  does  not 
mean that monoptic masking may not arise from mo-
nocular subcortical circuits (Macknik, 2006; Macknik & 
Martinez-Conde, 2004a). To be clear about the jargon: 
“monocular” means “with respect to a single eye”, and 
“monoptic” means either “monocular” or, “not different 
between the two eyes”. “Binocular” means “with respect 
to both eyes” and “dichoptic” means “different in the 
two eyes”. Thus, in dichoptic visual masking, the target 
is presented to one eye and the mask to the other eye, 
and the target is nevertheless suppressed. Excitatory 
binocular processing within the geniculocortical pathway 
occurs first in the primary visual cortex (Hubel, 1960; 
Le Gros Clark & Penman, 1934; Minkowski, 1920). Thus 
it has been assumed that dichoptic masking must origi-
nate from cortical circuits. The anatomical location in 
which dichoptic masking first begins is critical to our 
evaluation of most models of masking. It is also im-
portant to our understanding of LGN neurons and their 
relationship  to  the  subcortical  and  cortical  structures 
that feed-back onto them. In order to establish where 
dichoptic masking first begins, we first compared the 
perception of monoptic to dichoptic visual masking in 
humans over a wide range of timing conditions never 
before tested (Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 2004a), see 
Figure 8. We found that dichoptic masking was as robust 
as monoptic masking, and that it exhibited the same 
timing characteristics previously discovered for monop-
tic masking (Crawford, 1947; Macknik & Livingstone, 
1998; Macknik et al., 2000).
The following experiments set out to measure the 
physiological  correlates  of  monoptic  and  dichoptic 
visual masking in monkeys and humans.
Monoptic and dichoptic visual 
masking in monkeys
We recorded from LGN and V1 neurons in the awake 
monkey while presenting monoptic and dichoptic stimuli 
(Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 2004a). To the best of our 
knowledge, these were the first dichoptic masking ex-
periments to be conducted with single-unit physiological 
methods. We found that monoptic masking occurred in 
all the LGN and V1 neurons we recorded from, whereas 
dichoptic masking occurred solely in a subset of V1 bin-
ocular neurons (Figure 9). We also discovered that, in 
V1 binocular neurons, excitatory responses to monocular 
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Psychophysical examination of dichoptic versus monoptic 
masking  in  humans.  Human  psychophysical  measure-
ments  of  visual  masking  when  10  ms  duration  target 
and 300 ms duration mask were presented to both eyes 
together (monoptic masking) and to the two eyes sepa-
rately (dichoptic masking). The probability of discrimi-
nating correctly the length of two targets is diminished, 
in the average responses from 7 subjects, when targets 
were presented near the times of mask onset and ter-
mination. This is true regardless of whether the target 
and mask were presented to both eyes (open squares), 
or if the target was presented to one eye only and the 
mask was presented to the other (target = left, mask = 
right: closed upright triangles; target = right, mask = 
left:  closed  upside-down  triangles).  Open  squares  sig-
nify when the target was displayed with both shutters 
closed, showing that the stimuli were not visible through 
the shutters. When the mask and the target were pre-
sented simultaneously, both eyes’ shutters were neces-
sarily  open  (dichoptic  presentations  using  shutters  are 
impossible when both stimuli are presented at the same 
time), and so between times 0-250 ms all four conditions 
were equivalent. Dichoptic masking is nevertheless evi-
dent when the target was presented before the mask’s 
onset (-250 to -50 ms on the abscissa), as well as when 
the target was presented after the mask had been ter-
minated (300 ms to 500 ms on the abscissa). Reprinted 
from Macknik & Martinez-Conde (2004b). .The role of feedback in visual masking and visual processing
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targets were inhibited strongly by masks presented to 
the same eye, whereas interocular inhibition was surpris-
ingly weak. We concluded that the circuits responsible 
for monoptic and dichoptic masking must exist independ-
ently in at least two brain levels, one in monocular circuits 
and one in binocular circuits. Furthermore, Enns (2002) 
proposed that early monoptic masking circuits exhibited 
masking due to feedback from dichoptic levels, which we 
did not find. If monoptic masking in early visual areas 
was the result of feedback from higher areas, then the 
feedback connections would also convey strong dichoptic 
masking from the later circuits. Thus the early circuits 
would inherit this trait with the feedback (Figure 7), and 
they would exhibit dichoptic masking as well as monoptic 
masking. Since the earlier levels do not exhibit dichoptic 
masking, we concluded that visual masking in monoptic 
regions is not due to feedback from dichoptic regions. 
In summary, Macknik and Martinez-Conde (2004b) 
showed for the first time that dichoptic and monoptic 
masking are generated by two different circuits (i.e. 
one that lies in binocular cells and another that lies 
within  monocular  cells).  Several  studies  have  since 
verified this result psychophysically (Meese & Holmes, 
2007;  Petrov,  Carandini,  &  McKee,  2005;  Petrov  & 
McKee, 2006). Therefore the above results support the 
parsimonious hypothesis that the main circuit underly-
ing visual masking is lateral inhibition. 
Figure 9 shows that the strength of monoptic masking 
increases, in an iterative fashion, with each successive 
stage of processing in the visual system. Correspondingly, 
Hubel and Wiesel (Hubel & Wiesel, 1961) found that in-
hibitory surrounds were stronger in the LGN than in the 
retina. We proposed that lateral inhibition mechanisms 
gather strength iteratively in successive stages of the 
visual hierarchy. The result that dichoptic inhibition is 
weak in area V1 may reflect such a general principle, 
given  that  V1  binocular  neurons  represent  the  first 
stage where dichoptic inhibition could exist in the as-
cending visual system. If our iterative inhibitory buildup 
hypothesis  is  correct,  downstream  binocular  neurons 
in the visual hierarchy should show iteratively stronger 
interocular suppression and dichoptic masking. Further, 
dichoptic masking must become stronger downstream 
of V1, to account for the fact that the psychophysical 
magnitude of dichoptic masking is equivalent to that of 
monoptic masking (Figure 8). 
Monoptic and dichoptic visual 
masking in humans
To search for the neural correlates of masking at higher 
levels of the visual hierarchy, we turned to whole brain 
imaging  (functional  Magnetic  Resonance  Imaging; 
fMRI) techniques in humans (Tse et al., 2005). Masking 
illusions evoke reliable BOLD signals that correlate with 
perception within the human visual cortex (Dehaene 
et al., 2001; Haynes & Rees, 2005). Since the psycho-
physical strengths of monoptic and dichoptic masking 
are  equivalent  (Macknik  &  Martinez-Conde,  2004a; 
Schiller, 1965), we set out to find the point in the as-
cending visual hierarchy in which monoptic and dichop-
tic masking activity are both extant. This is the first 
point in the visual hierarchy at which awareness of vis-
ibility could potentially be maintained. Previous to this 
level, target responses will not be well inhibited during 
dichoptic masking: if these prior areas were sufficient 
to maintain visual awareness, the target would be per-
ceptually visible during dichoptic masking conditions. 
We measured BOLD signal in response to monop-
tic and dichoptic masking within individually mapped 
retinotopic areas in the human brain (Figure 10). Our 
results showed that dichoptic masking does not cor-
relate with visual awareness in area V1, but begins only 
downstream of area V2, within areas V3, V3A/B, V4 
Figure 9. 
Summary statistics of monoptic vs. dichoptic masking re-
sponses in the LGN and area V1. Monoptic (black bars) and 
dichoptic (white bars) masking magnitude as a function of 
cell type: LGN, V1 monocular, V1 binocular (non-respon-
sive to dichoptic masking), and V1 binocular (responsive 
to dichoptic masking) neurons. Inset shows the linear re-
gression of dichoptic masking magnitude in V1 binocular 
neurons as a function of their degree of binocularity (all 
neurons plotted were significantly binocular as measured 
by their relative responses to monocular targets presented 
to the two eyes sequentially): BI of 0 indicates that the 
cells  were  monocular,  while  a  BI  of  1  means  both  eyes 
were equally dominant. Reprinted from Macknik & Martin-
ez-Conde (2004b).136
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and later (Figure 11). The results agreed with previous 
primate electrophysiological studies using visual mask-
ing and binocular rivalry stimuli (Logothetis, Leopold, & 
Sheinberg, 1996; Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 2004a; 
Sheinberg  &  Logothetis,  1997),  as  well  as  with  one 
fMRI study of binocular rivalry in humans (Moutoussis, 
Keliris, Kourtzi, & Logothetis, 2005). We also found that 
the iterative increase in lateral inhibition we previously 
discovered from the LGN to V1 for monoptic masking 
(Figure 9), continued in the extrastriate cortex for di-
choptic masking (Figure 11c). This is an important fact 
in localizing the circuits responsible for maintaining vis-
ibility and visual awareness. For instance, if the brain 
areas that maintained visual awareness exhibited only 
weak target suppression (i.e. as in early visual areas 
such as the LGN and V1), then target masking would 
be incomplete and targets would be perceptually vis-
ible during masking. Since the perception of dichoptic 
masking is as strong as that of monoptic masking, and 
since the neural activity evoked by the target is only 
weakly suppressed by dichoptic masks prior to area V3, 
it follows that the circuits responsible for visibility must 
lie in V3 or later, or else targets would not be perceptu-
ally suppressed during dichoptic masking. 
Figure 10. 
Examples of retinotopy mapping from two subjects. (A & B) Visual areas delineated by retinotopic mapping analysis are 
indicated in different colors. Reprinted from Tse, et al. (2005).The role of feedback in visual masking and visual processing
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Having determined the lower boundary in the visual 
hierarchy for the visibility of simple targets, we set out 
to determine the upper boundary. To do this, we isolat-
ed the parts of the brain that both showed an increase 
in BOLD signal when the visible stimuli from the non-
illusory conditions (Target Only and Mask Only) were 
displayed, as well as a decrease in BOLD signal when 
the same targets were rendered less visible by visual 
masking. Surprisingly, only areas within the occipital 
lobe showed differential activation between visible and 
invisible targets (Figure 12). 
These combined results suggested that visual areas 
beyond V2, within the occipital lobe, are responsible 
for  maintaining  our  awareness  of  simple  unattended 
targets (Figure 13). Awareness of complex targets is 
expected to lie outside the occipital lobe, where higher 
visual processes take place.
In summary, our results show that masking in the 
early  visual  system  is  not  caused  by  feedback  from 
higher cortical areas that also cause dichoptic mask-
ing  and  interocular  suppression.  It  follows  that  the 
circuit that causes masking must be ubiquitous enough 
and simple enough that it exists at many or possibly 
all levels of the visual system. Lateral inhibition may 
be such a circuit. Lateral inhibition is the basis for all 
known receptive field structures in the visual system, 
and so it must be ubiquitous to all visual areas. This 
idea is strengthened by our findings that lateral inhibi-
tion increases iteratively at each progressive level of 
the visual hierarchy.
VeRIFICATION OF The LATeRAL 
INhIbITION FeeDFORWARD  
MODeL OF VISUAL MASKING
The  discussion  thus  far  has  reviewed  the  research 
for and against the role of feedback in visual mask-
ing.  The  current  evidence  supports  a  feedforward 
model based on lateral inhibition (Herzog et al., 2003; 
Macknik, 2006; Macknik & Livingstone, 1998; Macknik 
& Martinez-Conde, 2004b; Tucker & Fitzpatrick, 2006). 
If this model is correct, one should be able to verify it 
in a number of independent ways. 
One prediction of the model is that luminance in-
crements and decrements should result in neural tran-
sients in the primary visual cortex, and that transients 
should  rapidly  trigger  lateral  inhibition.  Tucker  and 
Fitzpatrick  (2006)  have  shown,  through  intracellular 
recordings in the primary visual cortex, that luminance-
evoked transients drive local lateral inhibition. 
Another  prediction  is  that  transient  responses  to 
spatiotemporal edges should be responsible for both 
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Figure 11. 
Retinotopic analysis of monoptic versus dichoptic masking. 
(A) The logic underlying the analysis of masking magnitude 
for hypothetical retinotopic areas. The Mask Only response 
is  bigger  than  the  Target  Only  response  because  masks 
subtend  a  larger  retinotopic  angle  than  targets,  and  are 
moreover presented twice in each cycle for 100 msec each 
flash, whereas the target is single-flashed for only 50 msec. 
If the target response adds to the mask response in the 
Standing Wave of Invisibility condition (SWI, see Figure 16) 
(because no masking percept was experienced), then the 
SWI response will be bigger than the Mask Only response. 
If the target does not add (masking percept), then the SWI 
response will be equal or smaller than the Mask Only re-
sponse (as the mask itself may also be somewhat recipro-
cally inhibited by the target). (B) Monoptic and dichoptic 
masking  magnitude  (%  BOLD  difference  of  Mask  Only  / 
SWI conditions) as a function of occipital retinotopic brain 
area, following the analysis described in panel A. Negative 
values indicate increased activation to the SWI condition 
(no masking), whereas values ≥ 0 indicate unchanged or 
decreased SWI activation (masking). (C) Dichoptic masking 
magnitude (% BOLD difference of Mask Only / SWI condi-
tions) as a function of occipital retinotopic brain area within 
the dorsal and ventral processing streams. The strength of 
dichoptic masking builds up throughout the visual hierarchy 
for both the dorsal (R2 = 0.90) and ventral (R2 = 0.72) 
processing streams. Reprinted from Tse, et al. (2005).138
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Figure 12. 
Localization of visibility-correlated responses to the occipital lobe. (A) An individual brain model from all perspec-
tives, including both hemispheres flat-mapped, overlaid with the functional activation from 17 subjects. The green 
shaded areas are those portions of the brain that did not show significant activation to Target Only stimuli. The blue 
voxels exhibited significant target activation (Target Only activation > Mask Only activation). Yellow voxels represent 
a significant difference between Control (target and mask both presented, with target-visible) and SWI (target and 
mask both presented, with target-invisible) conditions, indicating potentially effective visual masking, and thus a cor-
relation with perceived visibility. (B) Response time-course plots from Control versus SWI conditions in the occipital 
cortex. (C) Response time-course plots from Control versus SWI conditions in non-occipital cortex. (D) Response 
time-course plots from the non-illusory conditions (Target Only and Mask Only combined) in occipital versus non-
occipital cortex. This analysis controls for the possibility that occipital visual circuits have a higher degree of blood 
flow than non-occipital circuits. On the contrary, occipital BOLD signal to non-illusory stimuli is relatively low, as 
compared to non-occipital BOLD signal. Error bars in panels B, C, and D represent SEM between subjects. Reprinted 
from Tse, et al. (2005).The role of feedback in visual masking and visual processing
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target visibility (Macknik & Livingstone, 1998; Macknik 
et al., 2000), and also the suppressive action of masks 
(Macknik  &  Martinez-Conde,  2004a;  Macknik  et  al., 
2000). To test whether masks are most inhibitory at 
their spatial edges, we presented various sized masks 
that overlapped targets of stable size (Macknik et al., 
2000). This experiment was based on designs originally 
employed by the Crawford, Rushton, and Westheimer 
Figure 13. 
Layout of retinotopic areas that potentially maintain awareness of simple targets. An individual brain model from all per-
spectives, including both hemispheres flat-mapped, overlaid with the functional activation from one typical subject. The 
yellow shaded areas are those portions of the brain that did not show significant dichoptic masking (as in Figure 11B & 
11C), and thus are ruled out for maintaining visual awareness of simple targets. The pink colored voxels represent the 
cortical areas that exhibited significant dichoptic masking, and thus are potential candidates for maintaining awareness of 
simple targets. Reprinted from Tse, et al. (2005).140
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groups (Crawford, 1940; Rushton & Westheimer, 1962; 
Westheimer, 1965, 1967, 1970), but with the innova-
tion that the masks were both varied in size and not 
presented contemporaneously with the target (Figure 
14). As the masks’ edges moved away from the tar-
gets’ edges (that is, as the masks grew in size), the 
strength of the masking decreased. This confirmed that 
the masks’ spatial edges, as opposed to their interior, 
evoke the greatest inhibition to target visibility. 
To test whether masks were most inhibitory at their 
temporal edges, we conducted an experiment to deter-
mine the times of maximal inhibition during the mask’s 
lifetime: according to the lateral inhibition feedforward 
model, these times should be the onset and termina-
tion of the mask. We presented a long duration mask 
and assessed target visibility at various times during 
the mask’s lifetime (Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 2004a; 
Macknik et al., 2000) (Figure 15). This experimental 
design followed from Crawford (Crawford, 1947), but 
with  the  important  modification  that  we  also  varied 
the duration of the mask. No previous experiment had 
varied mask duration and so it had not been possible 
to establish whether inhibitory effects near the termi-
nation of the mask were truly caused by the mask’s 
termination, or whether they were delayed effects of 
the mask’s onset. 
The  spatiotemporal  lateral  inhibition  feedforward 
model of visual masking predicts several visual mask-
ing  and  other  illusions,  such  as  the  Standing  Wave 
of  Invisibility  (SWI)  illusion,  Temporal  Fusion,  and 
Flicker Fusion. These are reviewed in detail elsewhere 
(Macknik, 2006). 
Herzog et al. showed that not only first order lu-
minance  edges  but  also  second  order  edges,  and  in 
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Figure 14. 
Psychophysical length-discrimination measurements of visual masking from 23 human subjects using overlapping opaque 
masks of varied size (the distance from the mask’s edge to the target’s edge was 0°, 0.5°, 1°, 2°, or 4° as indicated in 
the insert). The subject’s task was to fixate on the central black dot and choose the longer target (right or left). Targets 
were black bars presented for 30 milliseconds; masks were also black and presented for 50 milliseconds. Targets turned 
on at time 0 ms, and masks were presented at various onset asynchronies so that they came on before, simultaneous 
to, or after the target in 20 ms steps. Stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) to the left of zero indicate forward masking 
conditions and SOAs greater than zero indicate backward masking. Miniature gray markers with dotted connecting lines 
represent conditions during which the target and mask overlapped in time and so the target was partially or completely 
occluded by the mask. The targets were 0.5° wide and had varied heights (5.5°, 5.0°, or 4.5°) and were placed 3° from 
the fixation dot. The mask was a bar 6° tall with varied widths, spatially overlapped and centered over each target. There 
were 540 conditions (2 possible choices X 2 differently sized target sets to foil local cue discrimination strategies X 5 
overlapping mask sizes X 27 stimulus onset asynchronies). Each condition was presented in random order 5 times to each 
subject, over a period of 2 days, for a total of 62,100 trials (summed over all 23 subjects). Reprinted from Macknik, et 
al. (2000).The role of feedback in visual masking and visual processing
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generalany kind of inhomogeneities, are important for 
masking,  and  can  be  mediated  by  lateral  inhibition 
mechanisms (Herzog & Fahle, 2002; Herzog & Koch, 
2001). 
The Standing Wave of Invisibility
The SWI illusion was the first perceptual prediction of 
the spatiotemporal feedforward lateral inhibition mod-
el.  This  illusion  combines  optimal  forward  and  back-
ward masking in a cyclic fashion, thus suppressing all 
transient responses associated with each flicker of the 
target (Figure 16). Without the mask, the target is a 
highly salient flickering bar, but with the mask present, 
the target becomes perceptually invisible (Macknik & 
Haglund, 1999; Macknik & Livingstone, 1998; Macknik 
& Martinez-Conde, 2004a, 2004b; Macknik et al., 2000; 
Tse et al., 2005). To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first illusion to have been predicted from neuro-
physiological data, rather than the other way around. 
The Enns and McGraw groups studied the psychophys-
ics of the SWI illusion (Enns, 2002; McKeefry, Abdelaal, 
Barrett, & McGraw, 2005). 
Breitmeyer  and  Öğmen  (2006)  stated  that  the 
SWI  illusion  is  the  strongest  form  of  visual  mask-
ing known. However, they credited Werner (Werner, 
1935) with the original discovery of the SWI. In doing 
so they changed the original definition of the SWI il-
lusion. As described above, the SWI illusion (Macknik 
& Livingstone, 1998) is defined by the combination 
of optimal forward and backward masking in a single 
sequence to achieve maximal masking of the target. 
Breitmeyer and Öğmen redefined the SWI illusion as 
occurring “when a sequence composed of a target and 
a surrounding mask is cycled” (Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 
2006, pg. 68). However, the most critical feature of 
the SWI is not the cycling per se, but the combination 
of  optimal  forward  and  backward  masking.”  (Where 
“combination of optimal forward and backward mask-
ing” is emboldened. Werner (1935) cycled target and 
mask in either forward or backward masking, but not 
in  both.  Moreover,  Macknik  and  Livingstone  (1998) 
first determined the optimal parameters for forward 
and backward masking: no previous study had varied 
the duration of both target and mask in order to as-
sess the optimal ISI for forward masking and STA for 
backward masking. Thus while there may have been 
a number of cyclic versions of visual masking in the 
past, the primary innovation of the SWI illusion was 
not its cyclic nature, but the fact that it first combined 
optimal forward and backward masking of the same 
target.
The FUNCTIONAL pROpeRTIeS OF 
FeeDbACK
We have discussed the data for and against the role of 
feedback in visual masking, and concluded that there is 
no strong evidence for feedback. Instead, we have pro-
posed a feedforward model of visual masking based on 
the same lateral inhibitory circuits that serve to form 
receptive field structure and to process the spatiotem-
poral edges of stimuli. However, given that feedback 
connections exist and make up such a large proportion 
of the neuroanatomical connectivity, we also concede 
that feedback must serve an important functional role. 
Here we review the literature on feedback processes in 
the visual system, and we propose a role for feedback 
that may explain the massive number of corticocortical 
and corticogeniculate back projections.  
Anatomical evidence of feedback 
within the visual hierarchy
The mammalian visual system includes numerous brain 
areas that are profusely interconnected. With few ex-
ceptions, these connections are reciprocal (Felleman & 
Van Essen, 1991). In the primate visual system, corti-
cocortical feedforward connections originate mainly in 
the superficial layers, although they may also arise from 
the deep layers (less than 10-15% of the connections), 
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Figure 15. 
Human  psychophysical  length-discrimination  measure-
ments of visual masking effects from 11 human subjects us-
ing non-overlapping masks of varied duration (100, 300, or 
500 ms). SOA here represents the period of time between 
the onset of the mask and the onset of the target (and so 
it has the opposite meaning than in Figures 3, 4 and 14). 
Masks (two 6° tall bars with a width of 0.5° flanking each 
side of each target) appeared at time 0, and targets could 
appear earlier (backward masking), simultaneously, or later 
(forward masking), in 50 ms steps. Targets were black and 
presented for 10 ms duration and masks were flanking black 
bars that abutted the target. Notice that target visibility is 
most greatly affected when the masks turn on and off. Re-
printed from Macknik, et al. (2000).142
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and  they  terminate  in  layer  4.  Feedback  connections 
originate in both superficial and deep layers, and they 
usually terminate outside of layer 4. In the human visual 
system, both feedforward and feedback connections can 
be observed before birth, although feedforward connec-
tions  reach  maturity  before  feedback  connections.  At 
first, both types of connections originate and terminate 
solely in the deep layers. At 7 weeks of age, both types 
of  fibers  reach  the  superficial  layers.  At  4  months  of 
age, feedforward connections are fully mature, whereas 
feedback  connections  are  still  at  an  immature  stage 
(Burkhalter, Bernardo, & Charles, 1993).
Although  anatomical  feedback  connections  are 
ubiquitous  throughout  the  visual  cortex,  subcortical 
regions also receive a large amount of feedback from 
cortical areas. For instance, corticogeniculate input is 
the largest source of synaptic afferents to the cat LGN. 
Whereas retinal afferents only encompass 25% of the 
total number of inputs to LGN interneurons, 37% of the 
synaptic contacts come from the cortex. In the case 
of relay cells, the respective percentages are 12% vs. 
58% (Montero, 1991). Boyapati and Henry (Boyapati 
& Henry, 1984) concluded that feedback connections 
from  the  cat  visual  cortex  to  the  LGN  concentrated 
a larger fraction of fine axons than feedforward con-
nections, resulting in comparatively slower conduction 
speeds. However, Girard and colleagues (Girard, Hupe, 
& Bullier, 2001) more recently found that feedforward 
and feedback connections between areas V1 and V2 of 
the monkey have similarly rapid conduction speeds. 
physiological evidence for feedback
Most physiological studies in the visual system have 
found that feedback connections enhance or decrease 
neuronal  responsiveness,  without  fundamentally  al-
tering response specificity. Although the role of such 
modulation in our visual perception remains unclear, 
it has been suggested that feedback may be involved 
in  attentional  mechanisms  (Martinez-Conde  et  al., 
1999).   
Corticogeniculate connections to the LGN are retin-
otopically organized, and they preferentially end on LGN 
layers with the same ocular dominance as the cortical 
cells of origin (Murphy & Sillito, 1996). Corticocortical 
feedback connections are also retinotopically specific 
(Salin, Girard, Kennedy, & Bullier, 1992). For instance, 
there is a functional projection from area 18 to area 
17 neurons with a similar retinotopic location (Bullier, 
McCourt, & Henry, 1988; Martinez-Conde et al., 1999; 
Salin et al., 1992; Salin, Kennedy, & Bullier, 1995).  
In the cat visual cortex, electrical stimulation from 
areas 18 and 19 demonstrated 50% of monosynaptic 
connections with superficial layers of area 17, in regions 
with  similar  functional  properties,  such  as  retinoto-
pic location (Bullier et al., 1988). Mignard and Malpeli 
also found that inactivation of area 18 in the cat led 
to decreased responses in area 17 (Mignard & Malpeli, 
1991). Martinez-Conde et al (1999) found that focal 
reversible inactivation of area 18 produced suppressed 
or enhanced visual responses in area 17 neurons with 
a similar retinotopy. In most area 17 neurons, orienta-
tion bandwidths and other functional characteristics re-
mained unaltered, suggesting that feedback from area 
18 modulates area 17 responses without fundamentally 
altering their specificity.
In  the  squirrel  monkey,  Sandel  and  Schiller  (1982) 
found that most area V1 cells decreased their visual re-
sponses when area V2 was reversibly cooled, although a 
few cells became more active (Sandell & Schiller, 1982). 
Orientation  selectivity  remained  unchanged,  although 
direction  selectivity  decreased  in  some  instances.  Bul-
lier et al. (1996) reported in the cynomologous monkey 
that, following GABA inactivation of area V2, V1 neurons 
showed decreased or unchanged responses in the center 
of the classical receptive field, but increased responses in 
the region surrounding it (Bullier, Hupe, James, & Girard, 
1996). These results were supported by subsequent find-
ings in areas V1, V2 and V3 following area MT inactivation 
(Hupe  et  al.,  1998).  More  recently,  Angelucci  and  col-
leagues (Angelucci & Bressloff, 2006; Angelucci, Levitt, & 
Lund, 2002) have suggested that area V1 extraclassical 
receptive field properties arise from area V2 feedback. 
In summary, physiological studies as a whole sug-
gest  that  feedback  connections  in  the  visual  system 
may  play  a  modulatory  role,  rather  than  a  specific 
role, in shaping the responses of hierarchically lower 
areas. This evidence agrees with the “no-strong-loops” 
Mask
Time
Backward Masking Forward Masking
100 ms
The Standing Wave of Invisibility Illusion
50 ms
Target
Figure 16. 
The time-course of events during the Standing Wave of In-
visibility illusion (SWI). A flickering target (a bar) of 50 ms 
duration is preceded and succeeded by two counter-phase 
flickering masks (two bars that abut and flank the target, 
but do not overlap it) of 100 ms duration that are presented 
at the time optimal to both forward and backward mask the 
target. Reprinted from Macknik (2006).The role of feedback in visual masking and visual processing
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hypothesis formulated by Crick and Koch (1998b). The 
no-strong-loops  hypothesis  proposes  that  all  strong 
connections in the visual system are of the feedforward 
type. That is, “the visual cortex is basically a feedfor-
ward system that that is modulated by feedback con-
nections”, which is “not to say that such modulation 
may not be very important for many of its functions”. 
Crick and Koch argued that “although neural nets can 
be  constructed  with  feedback  connections  that  form 
loops, they do not work satisfactorily if the excitatory 
feedback is too strong”. Similarly, if feedback connec-
tions formed “strong, directed loops” in the brain, the 
cortex would as a result “go into uncontrolled oscilla-
tions”. Therefore, the relative number of feedback vs. 
feedforward anatomical connections to any given visual 
area may be misleading as to the respective roles of 
such connections. For instance, the fact that the cat 
LGN receives substantially larger numbers of synapses 
from the cortex than from the retina (Montero, 1991) 
does not necessarily mean that corticogeniculate con-
nections are more important than retinogeniculate con-
nections in determining the response characteristics of 
LGN neurons. 
Top-down attention as a unitary 
explanation for feedback anatomy 
in the visual system
Based on the above evidence, one important role for 
feedback may be to carry attentional modulation sig-
nals. Other modulatory roles for feedback remain pos-
sible, but none are as clearly established. Thus it may 
be that all of the feedback connectivity exists for the 
sole purpose of mediating facilitatory and suppressive 
attentional feedback. At first, given the massive extent 
of  anatomical  feedback  vs.  feedforward  connections, 
this possibility may seem unlikely. Indeed, the great 
extent of feedback connectivity suggests to some that 
feedback must have a large number of roles (Sherman 
& Guillery, 2002; Sillito & Jones, 1996). However, we 
will argue here that the need for top-down attentional 
modulation, alone, could potentially explain the great 
number  of  feedback  connections.  Because  ascending 
circuits in the visual system form a primarily hierarchi-
cal and labeled-line structure, it follows that feedback 
inputs must require more wiring than feedforward in-
puts, to send back even the simplest signal. 
To illustrate the logic of this argument, let us con-
sider  the  anatomical  connectivity  between  the  LGN 
and V1. As previously described, LGN relay cells re-
ceive more numerous feedback from the cortex than 
the feedforward inputs they receive from the retina. 
However, because cortical receptive fields are orienta-
tion selective, and since LGN receptive fields are not 
oriented themselves, any functionally significant feed-
back  from  a  given  cortical  retinotopic  location  must 
represent all orientations. That is, for each unoriented 
geniculocortical  feedforward  connection,  there  must 
be many oriented corticogeniculate feedback connec-
tions; each with a different orientation, so that the sum 
of all feedback inputs may fill the orientation space. 
Otherwise, if the orientation space of the feedback was 
not filled completely, LGN receptive fields would show a 
significant orientation bias. Thus, anatomical feedback 
connectivity must be large so as to represent the entire 
orientation space at each retinotopic location. However, 
because of their orientation selectivity, only a fraction 
of the feedback connections will be functional at any 
given time, depending on the orientation of the stimu-
lus, whereas the feedforward connection will be consti-
tutively active irrespective of orientation. In summary, 
the massive feedback versus feedforward connectivity 
ratio can be misleading: this large ratio does not neces-
sarily mean that feedback signals are more important 
or more physiologically relevant than feedforward sig-
nals, because higher visual areas are more selective 
than lower visual areas, and so only a relatively small 
fraction  of  the  feedback  may  be  expected  to  be  ac-
tive at any given moment. Rather, feedback connec-
tions may need to tile the entire receptive field space 
of the higher level, or else the feedback would impose 
high-level receptive field properties on the lower areas. 
Figure 7 illustrates this idea in terms of dichoptic ver-
sus monoptic processing circuits.
Therefore, from basic principles of hierarchical con-
nectivity in the visual system (i.e. ascending pathways 
become more complex in their receptive field structure 
as they rise through the brain), we conclude that ana-
tomical feedback connections must be more numerous 
than feedforward connections. This would be true even 
if there was just a single functional purpose for feed-
back. 
If we combine these ideas with the Crick and Koch’s 
no-strong-loops  hypothesis,  we  may  conclude  that 
feedback can only be moderately modulatory as com-
pared to feedforward inputs, despite the fact that feed-
back  connections  are  more  numerous.  This  concept 
follows from the known physiology: besides their lack 
of orientation selectivity, another feature that distin-
guishes LGN from V1 receptive fields is their smaller 
size (Allman, Miezin, & McGuinness, 1985; Desimone, 
Schein, Moran, & Ungerleider, 1985; Kastner, Nothdurft, 
&  Pigarev,  1999;  Knierim  &  Van  Essen,  1991;  Zeki, 
1978a, 1978b). If feedback connections from V1 to the 144
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LGN were as strong as their feedforward counterparts 
(in physiological terms) then LGN receptive fields would 
be as large as V1 receptive fields, but they are not. 
That is, because LGN receptive fields are smaller than 
V1 receptive fields, feedback from V1 must be weaker 
than the input from the retina. 
It follows from these ideas that when feedback is 
operational, some receptive field  properties, such as 
size, which continues to increase throughout the visual 
hierarchy (Allman et al., 1985; Desimone et al., 1985; 
Kastner et al., 1999; Knierim & Van Essen, 1991; Zeki, 
1978a, 1978b) will be fed back from higher to lower 
levels. Thus we may predict that, if attention is carried 
by  feedback  connections,  the  earlier  receptive  fields 
should get bigger in size when attention is applied ac-
tively. This prediction has been confirmed experimen-
tally  (He,  Cavanagh, & Intriligator,  1996; Williford  & 
Maunsell, 2006). 
To conclude, feedback may have no other function 
than to modulate (facilitate or suppress) feedforward 
signals as a function of attentional state. 
The ROLe OF VISUAL MASKING, 
bINOCULAR RIVALRy, ATTeNTION, 
AND FeeDbACK IN The STUDy OF 
VISUAL AWAReNeSS
Let us assume that visual awareness is correlated to 
brain activity within specialized neural circuits, and that 
not all brain circuits maintain awareness. It follows that 
the neural activity that leads to reflexive or involun-
tary  motor  action  may  not  correlate  with  awareness 
because it does not reside within awareness-causing 
neural circuits (Macknik & Martinez-Conde, in press). 
Let us also propose that there is a “minimal set of 
conditions” necessary to achieve visibility, in the form 
of a specific type (or types) of neural activity within a 
subset of brain circuits. This minimal set of conditions 
will not be met if the correct circuits have the wrong 
type of activity (too much activity, too little activity, 
sustained activity when transient activity is required, 
etc). Moreover, if the correct type of activity occurs, 
but solely within circuits that do not maintain aware-
ness, visibility will also fail. Finding the conditions in 
which visibility fails is critical to the research described 
here: although we do not yet know what the minimal 
set of conditions is, we can nevertheless systematically 
modify potentially important conditions to see if they 
result in stimulus invisibility. If so, the modified condi-
tion will potentially be part of the minimal set.  
To establish the minimal set of conditions for vis-
ibility we need to answer at least 4 questions (Macknik, 
2006). The questions and their (partial) answers, are 
as follows:
1) What stimulus parameters are important to visibil-
ity?
The spatiotemporal edges of stimuli are the most 
important parameters to stimulus visibility (Macknik et 
al., 2000).
2) What types of neural activity best maintain visibility 
(transient versus sustained firing, rate codes, bursts 
of spikes, etc – that is,  what is  the neural code for 
visibility)?
Transient  bursts  of  spikes  best  maintain  visibility 
(Macknik & Livingstone, 1998; Macknik et al., 2000; 
Martinez-Conde, Macknik, & Hubel, 2000, 2002). 
3) What brain areas must be active to maintain vis-
ibility?
Visual  areas  downstream  of  V2,  lying  within  the 
occipital lobe, must be active to maintain visibility of 
simple unattended targets (Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 
2004a; Tse et al., 2005). 
4) What specific neural circuits within the relevant brain 
areas maintain visibility?
The specific circuits that maintain visibility are pres-
ently  unknown,  but  their  responsivity  is  modulated 
by  lateral  inhibition  (Macknik  &  Livingstone,  1998; 
Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 2004a, 2004b; Macknik et 
al., 2000).
We must also determine the set of standards that will 
allow us to conclude that any given brain area, or neural 
circuit within an area, is responsible for generating a 
conscious experience. Parker and Newsome developed 
a “list of idealized criteria that should be fulfilled if we 
are to claim that some neuron or set of neurons plays 
a critical role in the generation of a perceptual event” 
(Parker & Newsome, 1998). If one replaces the words 
“perceptual event” with “conscious experience”, Parker 
and Newsome’s list can be used as an initial foundation 
for the neurophysiological requirements needed to es-
tablish whether any given neuron or brain circuit may be 
the neural substrate of awareness (Macknik & Martinez-
Conde, in press). Parker and Newsome’s list follows:
1) The responses of the neurons and of the perceiving 
subject should be measured and analyzed in directly 
comparable ways.
2) The neurons in question should signal relevant in-
formation  when  the  organism  is  carrying  out  the 
chosen perceptual task: Thus, the neurons should 
have discernable features in their firing patterns in 
response to the different external stimuli that are 
presented to the observer during the task. 
3)  Differences  in  the  firing  patterns  of  some  set  of 
the candidate neurons to different external stimuli The role of feedback in visual masking and visual processing
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should be sufficiently reliable in a statistical sense 
to account for, and be reconciled with, the precision 
of the organism’s responses.
4) Fluctuations in the firing of some set of the candidate 
neurons to the repeated presentation of identical ex-
ternal stimuli should be predictive of the observer’s 
judgment on individual stimulus presentations.
5) Direct interference with the firing patterns of some 
set of the candidate neurons (e.g. by electrical or 
chemical stimulation) should lead to some form of 
measurable change in the perceptual responses of 
the subject at the moment that the relevant exter-
nal stimulus is delivered. 
6) The firing patterns of the neurons in question should 
not be affected by the particular form of the motor 
response that the observer uses to indicate his or 
her percept. 
7) Temporary or permanent removal of all or part of 
the candidate set of neurons should lead to a meas-
urable perceptual deficit, however slight or transient 
in nature.”  
However, visual circuits that may pass muster with 
Parker and Newsome’s guidelines may nevertheless fail 
to maintain awareness, as explained below. To guide 
the search for the neural correlates of consciousness 
(NCC), some additional standards must be added.  
The  first  additional  standard  concerns  the  use  of 
illusions as the tool of choice to test whether a neu-
ral  tissue  may  maintain  awareness.  Visual  illusions, 
by definition, dissociate the subject’s perception of a 
stimulus from its physical reality. Thus visual illusions 
are  powerful  devices  in  the  search  for  the  NCC,  as 
they  allow  us  to  distinguish  the  neural  responses  to 
the physical stimulus from the neural responses that 
correlate to perception. Our brains ultimately construct 
our perceptual experience, rather than re-construct the 
physical world (Macknik & Haglund, 1999). Therefore, 
an awareness-maintaining circuit should express activ-
ity  that  matches  the  conscious  percept,  irrespective 
of whether it matches the physical stimulus. Neurons 
(circuits, brain areas) that produce neural responses 
that fail to match the percept provide the most useful 
information because they can be ruled out, unambigu-
ously, as part of the NCC. As a result, the search for 
the NCC can be focused to the remaining neural tissue. 
Conversely, neurons that do correlate with perception 
are not necessarily critical to awareness, as they may 
simply play a support role (among other possibilities) 
without causing awareness themselves. 
The second new standard derives from a major con-
tribution of Crick and Koch’s: the distinction between 
explicit  and  implicit  representations  (Crick  &  Koch, 
1998a).  In  an  explicit  representation  of  a  stimulus 
feature, there is a set of neurons that represent that 
feature without  substantial  further  processing.  In  an 
implicit  representation,  the  neuronal  responses  may 
account for certain elements of a given feature, how-
ever the feature itself is not detected at that level. For 
instance, all visual information is implicitly encoded in 
the photoreceptors of the retina. The orientation of a 
stimulus, however, is not explicitly encoded until area 
V1, where orientation-selective neurons and functional 
orientation columns are first found. Crick and Koch pro-
pose that there is an explicit representation of every 
conscious percept. 
Here we propose the following corollary to Crick and 
Koch’s idea of explicit representation: Before one can 
test a neural tissue for its role in the NCC, such tissue 
must be shown to explicitly process the test stimulus. 
This corollary constrains the design of neurophysiologi-
cal experiments aimed to test the participation of spe-
cific neurons, circuits, and brain areas in the NCC.  
For instance, if one found that retinal responses do 
not correlate with auditory awareness, such a discov-
ery would not be carry great weight. The neurons in 
the eye do not process auditory information, and so it 
is not appropriate to test their correlation to auditory 
perception. However, this caveat also applies to more 
nuanced stimuli. What if V1 was tested for its correla-
tion to the perception of faces versus houses? Faces 
and houses are visual stimuli, but V1 has never been 
shown  to  process  faces  or  houses  explicitly,  despite 
the fact that visual information about faces and houses 
must implicitly be represented in V1. Therefore, one 
cannot test V1’s correlation to awareness using houses 
versus faces, and expect to come to any meaningful 
conclusion about V1’s role in the NCC. Because that 
form of information is not explicitly processed in V1, it 
would not be meaningful to the NCC if neurons in V1 
failed to modulate their response when the subject is 
presented with faces versus houses. 
It follows that some stimuli are incapable of local-
izing awareness within specific neural tissues, because 
no appropriate control exists to test for their explicit 
representation. For example, binocular rivalry stimuli 
pose a special problem in the study of visual aware-
ness.  Binocular  rivalry  (Wheatstone,  1838)  is  a  dy-
namic percept that occurs when two disparate images 
that  cannot  be  fused  stereoscopically  are  presented 
dichoptically  to  the  subject  (i.e.  each  image  is  pre-
sented independently to each of the subject’s eyes). 
The two images (or perhaps the two eyes) appear to 
compete with each other, and the observer perceives 
repetitive undulations of the two images, so that only 146
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one of them dominates perceptually at any given time 
(if the images are large enough then binocular rivalry 
can occur in a piecemeal fashion, so that parts of each 
image are contemporaneously visible). 
Binocular rivalry has been used as a tool to assess 
the  NCC,  but  has  generated  controversy  because  of 
conflicting results (Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 2004a; 
Tse et al., 2005). Some human fMRI studies report that 
BOLD activity in V1 correlates with visual awareness of 
binocular rivalry percepts (Lee, Blake, & Heeger, 2005; 
Polonsky, Blake, Braun, & Heeger, 2000; Tong & Engel, 
2001). In contrast, other human fMRI studies (Lumer, 
Friston, & Rees, 1998), and also single-unit recording 
studies in primates (Leopold & Logothetis, 1996), sug-
gest that activity in area V1 does not correlate with 
visual  awareness  of  binocular  rivalry  percepts.  One 
possible reason for this discrepancy is that none of the 
above studies determined that the visual areas tested 
contained the interocular suppression circuits necessary 
to mediate binocular rivalry. That is, since binocular ri-
valry is a process of interocular suppression, the neural 
tissue  underlying  the  perception  of  binocular  rivalry 
must  be  shown  to  produce  interocular  suppression 
– explicitly. Otherwise, it cannot be demonstrated that 
binocular rivalry is a valid stimulus for testing the NCC 
in such tissue. Thus, awareness studies using binocu-
lar rivalry are valid only in those areas that have been 
shown to maintain interocular suppression. If binocular 
rivalry fails to modulate activity within a visual area, 
one cannot know, by using binocular rivalry alone, if 
the perceptual modulation failed because awareness is 
not maintained in that area, or because the area does 
not  have  circuits  that  drive  interocular  suppression. 
This is more than just a theoretical possibility: as de-
scribed earlier, we have shown that the initial binocular 
neurons of the early visual system (areas V1 and V2) 
are binocular for excitation, but monocular for inhibi-
tion. That is, they fail to process interocular suppres-
sion explicitly (Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 2004a; Tse 
et al., 2005) (Figures 9 and 11).
Since there is no monoptic form of binocular rivalry, 
one cannot use binocular rivalry by itself to test the 
strength  of  interocular  suppression.  One  could  use 
binocular rivalry in tandem with a different stimulus, 
such as visual masking stimuli, to test for the explicit 
representation  and  strength  of  interocular  suppres-
sion, as described further below. But in such case, the 
role of the tissue in maintaining visibility and aware-
ness would have been probed by the visual masking 
stimuli, thus obviating the need for binocular rivalry 
stimuli. Because one must rely on non-binocular ri-
valry stimuli to determine the explicit representation 
and  strength  of  interocular  suppression  in  a  given 
area, it is not possible to unambiguously interpret the 
neural correlates of perceptual state using binocular 
rivalry alone. 
Our  visual  masking  studies  have  shown  that  bin-
ocular neurons in areas V1 (the first stage in the visual 
hierarchy where information from the two eyes is com-
bined) and V2 of humans and monkeys can integrate 
excitatory  responses  between  the  eyes  (Macknik  & 
Martinez-Conde, 2004a; Tse et al., 2005) (Figures 9 and 
11). However, these same neurons do not express inte-
rocular suppression between the eyes. That is, binocular 
neurons in V1 are largely binocular for excitation while 
nevertheless being monocular for suppression. In sum-
mary, most early binocular cells do not explicitly process 
interocular suppression, and so these neurons cannot 
process binocular rivalry explicitly. Thus binocular rivalry 
is an inappropriate stimulus to probe early visual areas 
for the NCC. This result renders the results from binocu-
lar rivalry studies that localize visual awareness in the 
visual system uninterpretable with respect to localizing 
the NCC: the fact that early visual areas are not cor-
related to awareness of binocular rivalry is equivalent 
in significance to concluding that these areas are not 
correlated to auditory awareness. However, these find-
ings also beg the question of why some studies have 
concluded that binocular rivalry can occur in low level 
visual areas (Haynes, Deichmann, & Rees, 2005; Lee 
et al., 2005; Polonsky et al., 2000; Tong & Engel, 2001; 
Wunderlich, Schneider, & Kastner, 2005). We propose 
that the reason for this discrepancy is that these studies 
have failed to properly control for the effects of atten-
tional feedback, thus confounding apparent inter-ocular 
suppression  effects  with  attention-modulated  activity. 
Essentially, the subjects in these studies attended to the 
stimuli of interest, and thus attention itself could be the 
cause of the retinotopic activation seen in these studies, 
not inter-ocular inhibition. 
Visual masking, on the other hand, has features that 
make it immune to these shortcomings, and so it is an 
ideal visual illusion to isolate the NCC. Because visual 
masking illusions allow us to examine the brain’s re-
sponse to the same physical target under varying levels 
of visibility, all we need to do is measure the perceptual 
and physiological effects of the target when it is visible 
versus invisible and we will determine many, if not all, 
of the conditions that cause visibility. 
We propose that, to test for explicit processing in 
neural tissue, one should use a visual illusion, such as 
visual masking, that can be presented in at least two 
modes of operation: one mode to ensure that the tis-
sue processes the stimulus explicitly, and one mode to The role of feedback in visual masking and visual processing
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test the correlation to awareness. In visual masking, 
the monoptic mode establishes that the neural tissue 
processes masking stimuli explicitly, and then the di-
choptic mode can be used to probe the NCC. 
The third strategy involves controlling for the effects 
of attention when designing experiments to isolate the 
NCC.  Attention  is  a  process  in  which  the  magnitude 
of neural activity is either enhanced or suppressed by 
high-level cognitive mechanisms (Desimone & Duncan, 
1995; McAdams & Maunsell, 1999; Moran & Desimone, 
1985; Spitzer, Desimone, & Moran, 1988; Williford & 
Maunsell, 2006). Therefore attention may increase or 
decrease the likelihood of awareness of a given visual 
stimulus. However, attention is a distinct process from 
awareness itself (Merikle, 1980; Merikle & Joordens, 
1997;  Merikle,  Smilek,  &  Eastwood,  2001).  For  in-
stance, low-level bottom-up highly salient stimuli (such 
as flickering lights) can lead to awareness and draw 
attention,  even  when  the  subject  is  actively  attend-
ing to some other task, or not attending to anything 
(i.e. when the subject is asleep). Thus awareness can 
modulate attention, but the opposite is also true. This 
double-dissociation  suggests  that  the  two  processes 
are mediated by separate brain circuits. It follows that 
in experiments to isolate the NCC, if the subject is con-
ducting a task that requires attention to the stimulus 
of interest, then attention and awareness mechanisms 
may be confounded. Therefore, experiments to isolate 
the NCC should control for the effects of attention. If 
experimental manipulation of attentional state affects 
the  magnitude  of  neural  response,  then  the  neural 
mechanism of interest may not be related to aware-
ness, but instead to attention.
Therefore, we add the following three standards to 
Parker and Newsome’s list:
18) The candidate neurons should be tested with an 
illusion that allows dissociation between the physi-
cal stimulus and its perception. If the candidate set 
of neurons is capable of maintaining awareness, 
the neural responses should match the subjective 
percept, rather than the objective physical reality 
of the stimulus.
19) The candidate neurons must explicitly process the 
type of information or stimulus used to test them.
10) The responses of the neurons, and of the perceiv-
ing subject, should be measured with experimental 
controls for the effect of attention. 
CONCLUSIONS
Several models of visual masking require feedback con-
nections to explain the mysterious timing of backward 
masking. While some physiological reports support the 
role of feedback in visual masking, we have argued here 
that none of these studies have controlled appropriately 
for the effects of attention, which is a well-known top-
down effect. In contrast, physiological and psychophysi-
cal studies that control for attention support feedforward 
models of visual masking. The spatiotemporal dynamics 
of feedforward lateral inhibition circuits within the vari-
ous levels of the visual hierarchy may explain the many 
different properties of visual masking, including seem-
ingly high-level cognitive effects. 
We have reviewed the literature on the anatomy and 
physiology of feedback in the visual system and conclud-
ed that feedback may exist solely to mediate attentional 
facilitation and suppression. We have also proposed that 
the large ratio of feedback to feedforward connections 
may not indicate a more significant physiological impact 
of feedback, but it may be a requirement of any feedback 
mechanism that operates within a hierarchical pathway 
in which receptive fields go from simple to complex as 
one rises within the hierarchy.
Finally, we have discussed the strengths of visual 
masking in the study of visual awareness, as compared 
to  binocular  rivalry,  and  have  concluded  that  visual 
masking  is  an  ideal  paradigm  in  awareness  studies, 
whereas binocular rivalry has serious shortcomings as 
a means to localize the NCC. Using visual masking as 
a tool, we have developed several new standards that 
must be met to determine the role of a neural circuit in 
maintaining the NCC.
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